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Opacity with Orwellian Observers and Intransitive
Non-interference⋆
John Mullins⋆⋆ and Moez Yeddes⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Dept. of Comp. & Soft. Eng.Dept., E´cole Polytechnique de Montre´al, Montreal (Quebec), Canada
Abstract. Opacity is a general behavioural security scheme flexible enough to ac-
count for several specific properties. Some secret set of behaviors of a system is opaque
if a passive attacker can never tell whether the observed behavior is a secret one or
not. Instead of considering the case of static observability where the set of observable
events is fixed off-line or dynamic observability where the set of observable events
changes over time depending on the history of the trace, we consider Orwellian par-
tial observability where unobservable events are not revealed unless a downgrading
event occurs in the future of the trace. We show how to verify that some regular secret
is opaque for a regular language L w.r.t. an Orwellian projection while it has been
proved undecidable even for a regular language L w.r.t. a general Orwellian observa-
tion function. We finally illustrate relevancy of our results by proving the equivalence
between the opacity property of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projection and the
intransitive non-interference property.
1 Introduction
Motivations Opacity has been introduced in [1] in the context of security protocols and
adapted to transition systems in [2]. Opacity is a very general security property scheme
parametrized by a predicate on system executions (the secret) and an equivalence relation
on system executions characterizing the intruder’s observation capabilities (each equiva-
lence class corresponds to an observable from the environment). The secret is opaque with
respect to an observation relation if any observation class containing a run in the secret,
contains also a run that is not in the secret in such a way that an intruder observing the
behavior of a system according to the observation relation cannot guarantee to infer from
this observation whether the observed trace belongs to the secret or not. By adjusting its
parameters, opacity can be instantiated to a large class of security or information flow prop-
erties (confidentiality, anonymity, non-interference) ([2,3]). Observation can be classified as
static, dynamic and Orwellian depending on the computational power of an observer that it
reflects. An observation relation that is static is defined a priori reflecting an observer who
always interprets the same event in the same way. Dynamic observation is prefix-based and
corresponds to observers able to deduce knowledge from previous events to interpret the cur-
rent one that is to each prefix correspond and interpretation of the current action. Orwellian
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observation is trace-based and depends at any time not only upon the trace prefix but also
upon the trace suffix reflecting observers able to use subsequent knowledge to re-interpret
events. Orwellian observation is required to instantiate opacity to security policies dealing,
for instance, with mechanisms for declassifying or downgrading information. The problem
of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observation is known to be undecidable even for finite transition
systems and a degenerated form of opacity [2]. Our aim is to define a class of Orwellian
observation relations expressive enough to express most of declassification policies like, for
instance, intransitive non-interference, when instantiating opacity to observation relations
in this class, while rendering decidable the problem of opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. this
class for finite transition systems.
Contributions Our contributions are related to the study of opacity under a class of Or-
wellian observation relations that we called Orwellian projections and its relation to intran-
sitive non-interference. An Orwellian projection πo,d is a natural projection of a sequence of
events Σ∗ on observable events Σ∗o unless a downgrading event in Σd occurs subsequently. In
this case, the prefix up to this downgrading event is left invariant by πo,d. Our contributions
are twofold: first, they provide solutions to the verification problem for opacity w.r.t. πo,d
and second, they relate opacity w.r.t. πo,d to another concept used in the formal security
community namely, intransitive non-interference (INI).
Concerning the verification problem, our first contribution is a language-theoretic char-
acterization of opacity w.r.t. πo,d in terms of opacity w.r.t. natural projections (Theorem 1).
It has to be noted that this characterization is not in itself an effective procedure since
opacity verification w.r.t. πo,d is reduced to an infinite number of verifications of opacity
w.r.t. natural projections. The first step toward an algorithm, our main contribution to
the verification problem (Theorem 2), is based on Theorem 1 and the construction of a
transition system incorporating the regular secret together with the finite transition system
modeling the original system. Opacity verification w.r.t. πo,d is then reduced to the verifi-
cation of opacity of, in the worst case, N regular secrets w.r.t. natural projections for N
finite transition systems where N is the number of downgrading transitions of the original
system.
Lastly, as an application that illustrates the relevancy of the notion of opacity w.r.t.
Orwellian projections, we show that opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projection
and intransitive non-interference are reducible to each other (Theorems 4 and 5). In order
to prove this, we prove, as a building block, such a characterization of opacity of regular
languages w.r.t. natural projections and non-interference (Theorem 3), generalizing, as a side
effect, a similar result obtained in [2] for a degenerated form of opacity and non-interference.
Related work Algorithms for verifying opacity in Discrete Event Systems w.r.t. projections
are presented together with applications in [4,5,6,3]. In [4], the authors consider a concurrent
version of opacity and show that it is decidable for regular systems and secrets. In [5], the
authors define what they called secrecy and provide algorithms for verifying this property.
A system property satisfies secrecy if the property and its negation are state-based opaque.
In [3] the author provides an algorithm for verifying state-based opacity (called strong opac-
ity) and shows how opacity can be instantiated to important security properties in computer
systems and communication protocols, namely anonymity and secrecy. In [6], the authors
define the notion of K-step opacity where the system remains state-based opaque in any
step up to depth-k observations that is, any observation disclosing the secret has a length
greater than k. Two methods are proposed for verifying K-step opacity. In [7], the authors
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introduce dynamic projections where the set of events the user can observe changes over
time and show how to check that a system is opaque w.r.t. that class of dynamic observation
functions.
Non-interference (NI) and intransitive non-interference (INI) for deterministic Mealy
machines have been defined in [8]. In [9], an algorithm is provided for INI. A formulation of
INI within the context of non-deterministic LTSs is given in [10], in the form of a property
called admissible interference (AI), which is verified by reduction to the verification of a
stronger version than NI called strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) in [11]
of N finite transition systems where N is the number of downgrading transitions of the
original system. It coincides with INI in the case of deterministic LTS. In [12], various
notions of INI properties are considered and compared but no comparison with Rushby’s
original definition is provided. In [13], the observability theory of discrete event systems
is used to formulate and provide an algorithmic approach to the INI verification problem.
In [14], the author has argued that Rushby’s definition of security for intransitive policies
that corresponds roughly to our notion of Orwellian projection suffers from some flaws, and
proposed some stronger variations in the context of deterministic Mealy machines. In [15],
the authors reformulate Rushby’s definition in the setting of deterministic LTSs. Verification
is then reduced to the verification of an equivalent characterization to SNNI called strong
non-deducibility on compositions (SNDC) in [11] of N finite transition systems where N is
the number of high-level transitions in the original system.
Paper organization The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some pre-
liminaries in labeled transition systems and opacity. In Section 3, we define and provide a
verification algorithm of with respect to Orwellian projections. Finally, in section 4 we show
the equivalence between the opacity problem w.r.t. Orwellian projections and intransitive
non-interference.
2 Opacity in Transition Systems
2.1 Labeled transition systems and their languages
A finite deterministic labeled transition system over Σ is a 4-tuple G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0), where
Σ denotes the alphabet of events, Q denotes the state space, δ is a partial function from
Q ×Σ to Q, called labeled transition function and q0 the initial state. The partial function
δ is naturally extended to a partial function δ : Q× Σ∗ → Q defined recursively on strings
in Σ∗ as follows: δ(q, ǫ) = q and δ(q, s · α) = δ(δ(q, s), α) where ǫ denotes the empty word
and, given s, s′ ∈ Σ∗, s · s′, the concatenation of s with s′. A state q ∈ Q is reachable
from q′ (or simply reachable, if q′ = q0) if there is a word s ∈ Σ
∗ such that δ(q′, s) = q.
G is finite if Q and Σ are. G is reduced if any state in Q is reachable. G is complete if δ
is a (total) function. For q ∈ Q, the transition system obtained from G by starting from
q is defined as Gq = (Σ,Q, δ, q). For Σ′ ⊆ Σ, the restriction of G to Σ \ Σ′ is defined as
G \ Σ′ = (Σ \ Σ′, Q, δ′, q0) where δ
′ = δ|(Σ \ Σ′) that is, the restriction of δ to Σ \ Σ′.
Lastly, given two transition systems G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) and G
′ = (Σ,Q′, δ′, q′0) over the same
alphabet Σ, their product is the labeled transition system G×G′ = (Σ,Q×Q′, δ×δ′, (q0, q
′
0))
where (δ × δ′)((q, q′), α) = (δ(q, α), δ′(q′, α)).
The concatenation product is extended to languages as follows: given L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗, L·L′ =
{s · s′ : s ∈ L and s′ ∈ L′}. {s} · L will be simply denoted by s · L. In the sequel we let
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s−1L denote the left quotient of L by s that is, the set {t ∈ Σ∗ : s · t ∈ L} and L denote
the prefix-closure of L that is, the set {s ∈ Σ∗ : ∃t ∈ Σ∗ s.t. s · t ∈ L}. The language of
G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) is the set of words
L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ : δ(q0, s) is defined}.
For F ⊆ Q, the set of words recognized by states in F is defined as LF (G) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ :
δ(q0, s) ∈ F}.
2.2 Opacity
We consider a language L ⊆ Σ∗ modelling the behavior of a system and Σo ⊆ Σ. Opacity
qualifies a predicate ϕ, given as a subset of L, with respect to an observation function O
from Σ∗ onto set Σ∗o of observables modelling user capabilities for observing the system.
Two strings s and s′ of L are equivalent w.r.t. O if they produce the same observable:
O(s) = O(s′). The set O−1(o) ∩ L (written [s]LO) is called an observation class.
Definition 1 (Opacity). Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗, a language ϕ ⊆ L is opaque for L
w.r.t. O if,
∀s ∈ ϕ, ∃s′ ∈ [s]LO s.t. s
′ /∈ ϕ (1)
The information flow deduced by the attacker when the system is not opaque is captured
by the notion of secret disclosure.
Definition 2 (Secret disclosure). A string s ∈ ϕ discloses the secret ϕ in L w.r.t. O if
[s]LO ⊆ ϕ.
Remark 1. It follows immediately from the definitions that a secret ϕ ⊆ L opaque for L
w.r.t. O if and only if there is no s ∈ ϕ disclosing the secret ϕ in L w.r.t. O. Equivalently,
a secret ϕ ⊆ L opaque for L w.r.t. O if and only if O(ϕ) ⊆ O(L \ ϕ).
Natural projections provide a class of static observation functions. Given a language
L ⊆ Σ∗ and Σo ⊆ Σ, the natural projection of L on Σo is the language πo(L) where πo is
the function from Σ∗ to Σ∗o defined by πo(ǫ) = ǫ and
πo(s · α) =
{
πo(s) · α if α ∈ Σo,
πo(s) otherwise.
(2)
In the sequel we will denote [s]Lπo by [s]
L
o for s ∈ Σ
∗ and L ⊆ Σ∗ in order to simplify the
notation.
Proposition 1 ([4]). Given L and ϕ, regular, it is decidable whether ϕ is opaque for L
w.r.t. πo.
Proof. ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo if and only if πo(ϕ) ⊆ πo(L \ ϕ). As ϕ and L are regular,
L\ϕ is regular and since πo is a morphism and images under morphisms of regular languages
are regular, this relation can be decided.
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Example 1. Let Σ = {h1, h2, a, b, c}, Σo = {a, b, c} and L, the prefix-closed language ac-
cepted by the finite automaton of Fig. 1 (where all states are accepting states). Consider the
natural projection on Σo as observation function. Define the secret language ϕ = a
∗(b∗+c∗).
This secret need to be not deduced by the user of the system, knowing that h1 and h2 are not
observable. ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. πo, as by observing abb, it is the only one in [abb]
L
o .
Note that if the attacker observes only ab, he can not deduce whether the current sequence
of actions of the system belongs to the secret since [ab]Lo = {ab, h2ab} and h2ab /∈ ϕ.
0 1
2
34
678
59
a
c
b
c
a
a
h1
b
c
h2
a
ab
c
Fig. 1. A non opaque system w.r.t. pio
3 Opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projections
In this section we consider a class of Orwellian observation functions that we call Orwellian
projections. Throughout this section, we will consider languages over an alphabet Σ parti-
tioned into three sub-alphabets Σo, Σu and Σd. Σo is a set of observable events, Σu a set
of unobservable events unless a downgrading event in Σd occurs.
3.1 Opacity generalized to Orwellian projections
We now define the notion of Orwellian projection.
Definition 3. Let Σo, Σd ⊆ Σ. The Orwellian projection on Σo unless Σd is the mapping
πo,d : Σ
∗ → Σ∗ defined by πo,d(ǫ) = ǫ and
πo,d(sα) =


sα if α ∈ Σd,
πo,d(s)α if α ∈ Σo,
πo,d(s) otherwise.
(3)
In the sequel we denote [s]Lπo,d by [s]
L
o,d for s ∈ Σ
∗ and L ⊆ Σ∗ in order to simplify the
notation.
An illustration of the expressiveness of Orwellian projections to model information de-
classification or intransitive information flow arising when downgrading information is pro-
vided in the following example.
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Example 2. Consider the automaton G2 given in Figure 2 with the set Σ = Σo ∪ Σu ∪ Σd
where Σo = {l}, Σu = {h} and Σd = {d}. Let L=L(G2). Consider now a secret described
by the language ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}∗. We can check easily that [hl]Lo,d = {hl}, [hdl]
L
o,d =
{hdl, hdhl} and [hdhln]Lo,d = {hdhl
n} for any n > 1 . Hence ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d
because hl is the only trace that can be observed as l and hl is in the secret. Consequently,
hl discloses the secret ϕ. Moreover, as the first h has been revealed by downgrading in hdl
and any trace in hdhll∗, hdhlln, for n ∈ N, is the only trace to be observed as hdlln and
hdhlln is in the secret. Hence hdhlln discloses the secret also for n ∈ N.
1 2
3
h
l
4
5
6
7 l
d
l
h
l
Fig. 2. A non-opaque system w.r.t. pio,d
Let us define the smallest set containing the empty string and prefixes in L ending with
a downgrading event:
D(L) = {ǫ} ∪ (L ∩Σ∗Σd) (4)
and for each s ∈ D(L), its continuation in (Σ\Σd)
∗:
C(s, L) = (Σo ∪Σu)
∗ ∩ s−1L.
The following result derives directly:
Proposition 2. Let Σ = Σo ∪ Σu ∪ Σd and L ⊆ Σ
∗. Then any u ∈ L admits a unique
factorization u = st such that s ∈ D(L) and t ∈ C(s, L). In this factorization, s is the
longest prefix of L terminating with a d ∈ Σd.
Remark 2. Note that for any s ∈ D(L), and t ∈ C(s, L), πo,d(st) = sπo(t) as s ∈ {ǫ}∪Σ
∗Σd
and u ∈ (Σo ∪Σu)
∗ and hence, [st]Lo,d ⊆ s[t]
C(s,L)
o (the reverse inclusion is obvious), linking
in that way the Orwellian projection πo,d and the static projection πo.
The following theorem reduces opacity disclosure w.r.t. πo,d to opacity disclosure w.r.t.
πo.
Theorem 1. A secret ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d if and only if forall s ∈ D(ϕ), C(s, ϕ)
is opaque for C(s, L) w.r.t. the projection function πo.
Proof. =⇒: Suppose that there exists s0 ∈ D(ϕ) such that C(s0, ϕ) is not opaque for
C(s0, L) w.r.t. πo. Hence there exists t0 ∈ C(s0, ϕ) s.t. t0 discloses the secret C(s0, ϕ) in
C(s0, L) w.r.t. πo and,
∀s′ ∈ [t0]
C(s0,L)
o , s
′ ∈ C(s0, ϕ). (5)
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As s0t0 ∈ ϕ we have,
∀t′ ∈ [s0t0]
L
o,d, πo,d(t
′) = πo,d(s0t0) = s0πo(t0). (6)
Consequently,
∀t′ ∈ [s0t0]
L
o,d, t
′ ∈ ϕ,
that is, s0t0 discloses the secret ϕ in L w.r.t. πo,d, and then the secret ϕ is not opaque for
L. w.r.t. πo,d.
⇐=: We need to prove if ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d implies there exists s ∈ D(L)
such that C(s, ϕ) is not opaque for C(s, L) w.r.t. πo.
Let t0 disclose the secret ϕ in L w.r.t. πo,d, then t0 = s0u0 with s0 ∈ D(ϕ) and u0 ∈
C(s, Lϕ). To prove the result, we will show that u0 discloses the secret C(s0, ϕ) in C(s0, L)
w.r.t. πo. Since t0 discloses the secret ϕ in L w.r.t. πo,d, then for all t
′ ∈ [t0]
L
o,d, t
′ ∈ ϕ. As
[t0]
L
o,d = s0[u0]
C(s0,L)
o then for all u′ ∈ [u0]
C(s0,L)
o , u′ ∈ C(s0, ϕ) and hence, u0 discloses the
secret C(s0, ϕ) in C(s0, L) w.r.t. πo.
3.2 Checking opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projections
The verification procedure is based on a product where the secret is incorporated into the
transition system. Let a finite LTS G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) and F ⊆ Q s.t. LF (G) = L and a regular
secret ϕ ⊆ Σ∗ that we can consider w.l.o.g. included in L (otherwise one takes L ∩ ϕ as
secret). First, one constructs a complete deterministic transition system Gϕ = (Σ,Q
′, δ′, q′0)
and a set Fϕ ⊆ Q
′ s.t. LFϕ(Gϕ) = ϕ. Next, we compute the product G# = G × Gϕ,
F# = F × Q
′ and Fϕ# = F × Fϕ. Then we have LFϕ#(G#) = ϕ and, because Gϕ is
complete, LF#(G#) = L.
Example 3. Consider the automaton G2 = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) of Example 2 in Figure 2 with L =
L(G2) and ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}
∗. Taking G2ϕ as the complete deterministic automaton
depicted in Figure 3 with Fϕ = {3, 7}, we get that G2# = G2, F# = Q and Fϕ# = {3, 7}
as depicted in Figure 4.
1 2
3
h
l
4
5
6
7 l
h, d, l
d h
ld, l
h
d, h
d, h
h, d, l
d, h
Fig. 3. G2ϕ for ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}
∗ with Fϕ = {3, 7}
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Fig. 4. G2# with F# = Q and Fϕ# = {3, 7} for ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}
∗
Hence, in the rest of this paper and w.l.o.g., we assume that G = G#, F = F# and Fϕ =
Fϕ# and thus LFϕ(G) = ϕ and LF (G) = L. Let Qd = {q0}∪{q ∈ Q : ∃q
′ ∈ Q s.t. δ(q′, d) =
q}.
We are now ready for the verification result establishing, as a consequence, the decid-
ability of the opacity verification problem w.r.t. πo,d of regular secrets for regular languages.
Theorem 2. ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d iff for all q ∈ Qd, LFϕ(G
q \ Σd) is opaque for
LF (G
q \Σd) w.r.t. πo.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d then, by Theorem 1, for some s0 ∈ D(ϕ)
and t0 ∈ C(s0, ϕ), t0 discloses the secret C(s0, ϕ) in C(s0, L) w.r.t. πo. Let q = δ(q0, s0).
Clearly, q ∈ Qd and since LFϕ(G
q \ Σd) = C(s0, ϕ) and LF (G
q \ Σd) = C(s0, L), it turns
out that LFϕ(G
q \Σd) is not opaque for LF (G
q \Σd) w.r.t. πo.
Conversely, suppose that for some q ∈ Qd, LFϕ(G
q \Σd) is not opaque for LF (G
q \Σd)
w.r.t. πo. Hence, there are some s0 ∈ Σ
∗ ·Σd ∪ {ǫ} and t0 ∈ LFϕ(G
q \Σd) s.t. δ(q0, s0) = q
(since q ∈ Qd) and t0 discloses the secret LFϕ(G
q \ Σd) in LF (G
q \ Σd) w.r.t. πo. Clearly,
LFϕ(G
q \Σd) = C(s0, ϕ) and LF (G
q \Σd) = C(s0, L). Since s0 · [t0]
C(s0,L)
o = [s0 · t0]
L
o,d and
s0 · t0 ∈ ϕ, s0 · t0 discloses the secret in ϕ w.r.t. πo,d (Theorem 1).
Example 4. Consider again the LTS G2 = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) of Example 2 in Figure 2 with L =
L(G2) and ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}
∗. In this case, Qd = {1, 4}. ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t.
πo,d because G
1
2 \ {d} is not opaque w.r.t. πo since hl discloses the secret. This reflects
the case where there is no downgrading along the run (Figure 5(a)). But this is also the
case that G42 \ {d} is not opaque w.r.t. πo since any sequence in hll
∗ discloses the secret
after downgrading. This reflects that sequences in hdhll∗ discloses the secret w.r.t. πo,d
(Figure 5(b)).
4 Opacity w.r.t. Orwellian Projection and Intransitive
Non-Interference
In this section, we show how our notion of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projection relates to
transitive and intransitive non-interference. For (transitive) non-interference, the alphabet
of events Σ is partitioned into two sets, High (private actions) and Low (public actions). A
system is non-interferent if it is not possible for a public observer to infer information from
the public actions about the presence of private actions in the original run (See [8] and [11]
for a discussion on non-interference).
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1 2
3
h
l
(a) Non-opacity of {hl}
for G12\{d} w.r.t. pio
4
5
6
7 l
l
h
l
(b) Non-opacity of
{hll∗} for G42 \ {d}
w.r.t. pio
Fig. 5. Opacity of ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l}∗ for G2 w.r.t. pio,d.
Definition 4. Let a LTS G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) and F ⊆ Q s.t. L = LF (G) then L satisfies
non-interference (NI) if πLow(L) ⊆ L.
For intransitive non-interference, Σ is partitioned into three sets High (private ac-
tions), Low (public actions) and Down (downgrading actions). A system is intransitive
non-interferent if it non-interferent unless a downgrading action occurs and discloses all pri-
vate actions encountered so far. A discussion on intransitive non-interference can be found
in [8,12] and [14].
Definition 5. Let a LTS G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) and F ⊆ Q s.t. L = LF (G) then L satisfies
intransitive non-interference (INI) if πHigh,Down(L) ⊆ L.
The following result reduces the INI verification problem to N instances of the NI veri-
fication problem where N is the number of downgrading transitions in G.
Proposition 3. Let a LTS G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) and F ⊆ Q s.t. L = LF (G). L satisfies INI iff
for all q ∈ Qd, LF (G
q \Down) satisfies NI.
This result restates in a language-theoretic setting, a result due to [10]. As a first result
in this section, with the aim to build a reduction from opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. an
Orwellian projection to INI, we extend a result due to [2] and reducing a degenerated form
of opacity w.r.t. natural projection to NI.
Theorem 3. The opacity verification problem of regular secrets w.r.t. πo for regular lan-
guages is reducible to the NI verification problem for finite systems.
Proof. Let G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) be a transition system and F, Fϕ ⊆ Q s.t. L = LF (G) and
ϕ = LFϕ . We construct a labeled transition system G
♭ = (Σ♭, Q♭, δ♭, q♭0) and F
♭ ⊆ Q♭ s.t.
Σ♭ = Σo ∪· {h}
Q♭ = (Q× {0}) ∪ (Fϕ × {1})
δ♭ = {((q, 0), α, (q′, 0)) : (q, α, q′) ∈ δ and α ∈ Σo} ∪
{((q, 0), ǫ, (q′, 0)) : (q, α, q′) ∈ δ and α ∈ Σu} ∪
{((q, 0), h, (q, 1)) : q ∈ Fϕ}
q♭0 = (q0, 0)
F ♭ = (F ∩ (Q \ Fϕ)× {0}) ∪ (Fϕ × {1}).
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Now, we consider a non-interference problem for G♭ with the following partitioning: Low =
Σo ∪ {ǫ} and High = {h} and finally, we show that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo iff L
♭ =
LF ♭(G
♭) satisfies NI.
=⇒: Suppose that L♭ = LF ♭(G
♭) does not satisfies NI then there is s′0 ∈ πLow(L
♭) =
LFϕ×{0}(G
♭) s.t. s′0 6∈ L
♭. Thus s′0 6∈ LF∩(Q\Fϕ)(G
♭). Hence, for s0 ∈ LF (G) s.t. πo(s0) = s
′
0,
s0 ∈ LFϕ(G) but for any s 6∈ ϕ, πo(s) 6= πo(s0), that is, s0 discloses ϕ w.r.t. πo.
⇐=: Suppose that ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. πo then for some s0 ∈ L, s0 dis-
closes the secret ϕ that is, [s0]
L
πo ⊆ ϕ, s
′
0 = πo(s0) · h ∈ LFϕ×{1}(G
♭) ⊆ L♭ and hence
πLow(s
′
0) = πo(s0) ∈ πLow(L
♭) and πLow(s
′
0) 6∈ L
♭ since πo(s0) 6∈ LF∩(Q\Fϕ)(G
♭). Conse-
quently πLow(L
♭) 6⊆ L♭.
Now, we build a reduction of opacity w.r.t. an Orwellian projection to INI by using the
previous reduction as building blocks:
Theorem 4. Opacity verification of regular secrets w.r.t. πo,d for regular languages is re-
ducible to INI verification of finite systems.
Proof. Let G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) be a transition system and F, Fϕ ⊆ Q s.t. L = LF (G) and
ϕ = LFϕ . We construct a labeled transition system G
♮ = (Σ♮, Q♮, δ♮, q♮0) and F
♮ ⊆ Q′ s.t.
Σ♮ = Σo ∪· Σd ∪· {h}
Q♮ = (Q × {0}) ∪ (Fϕ × {1})
δ♮ = {((q, 0), α, (q′, 0)) : (q, α, q′) ∈ δ and α ∈ Σo ∪Σd} ∪
{((q, 0), ǫ, (q′, 0)) : (q, α, q′) ∈ δ and α ∈ Σu} ∪
{((q, 0), h, (q, 1)) : q ∈ Fϕ}
q♮0 = (q0, 0)
F ♮ = (F ∩ (Q \ Fϕ)× {0}) ∪ (Fϕ × {1}).
Now, we consider an intransitive non-interference problem for G♮ with the partitioning
Low = Σo, Down = Σd and High = {h}, and we show that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d iff
L♮ = LF ♮(G
♮) satisfies INI. It has first to be noted that, by construction, for any q ∈ Qd,
LF ♭((G
q \Σd)
♭) = LF ♮(G
♮(q,0) \Down) (7)
and second, that for any q ∈ Fϕ, (q, 1) 6∈ Q
♮
d since the only transition going into these states
is an h-transition. Hence,
Q♮d = Qd × {0}. (8)
Also, ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πo,d iff for any q ∈ Qd,
LFϕ(G
q \Σd) is opaque for LF (G
q \Σd) w.r.t. πo
(by Theorem 2)⇐⇒
LF ♭((G
q \Σd)
♭) satisfies NI (by Theorem 3)⇐⇒
LF ♮(G
♮(q,0) \Down) satisfies NI (by Eq. 7)⇐⇒
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for all q ∈ Q♮d,
LF ♮(G
♮q \Down) satisfies NI (by Eq. 8) ⇐⇒
LF ♮(G
♮) satisfies INI (by Proposition 3)
Finally, we define a reverse reduction extending a similar reduction defined in [2] from
NI to opacity w.r.t. natural projection.
Theorem 5. INI verification for finite systems is reducible to opacity verification of regular
secrets w.r.t. πLow,Down for regular languages.
Proof. Let G = (Σ,Q, δ, q0) be a transition system with Σ = High ∪· Low ∪· Down, F,⊆ Q
s.t. L = LF (G) and ϕ = {s ∈ LF (G) : πLow,Down(s) 6= s}. We show that L satisfies INI iff
ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. πLow,Down.
=⇒: Suppose that L = LF (G) does not satisfies INI, then for some u0 ∈ L, πo,d(u0) 6∈ L.
Hence, u0 ∈ ϕ (since πo,d(u0) 6= u0) and [u0]
L
o,d ⊆ ϕ (otherwise, πo,d(u0) ∈ L, getting a
contradiction). Consequently, u0 discloses ϕ.
⇐=: Suppose that s ∈ ϕ, then πo,d(s) 6= s and also, there is an s
′ ∈ L s.t. πo,d(s
′) =
πo,d(s) and πo,d(s
′) ∈ L since L satisfies INI. Moreover πo,d(s
′) 6∈ ϕ since πo,d(πo,d(s
′)) =
πo,d(s
′). Thus ϕ is opaque w.r.t. πo,d for L.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the opacity verification problem in the context of fi-
nite systems, regular secrets and a class of Orwellian observation functions that we called
Orwellian projections. As an illustration of the relevancy of this problem in the context of
the verification of information flow properties in the domain of security-critical systems, we
have related opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projections to INI for finite systems by showing a com-
putational equivalence between both notions, providing , as a side effect a characterization
of NI for finite systems with opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. natural projections for regular
languages.
We are now investigating the opacity synthesis problem consisting of compute the supre-
mal opaque sublanguage w.r.t. Orwellian projection of a given language, and its dual prob-
lem, which is also very challenging since, in this case, there is a large range of modifications to
the initial system that can be considered, e.g., enlarging the behavior of the non-secret part
inserting suitable downgrading actions whenever possible or cutting some possible secret
behaviors. In future works, we will investigate the problem of supervisory control for opac-
ity w.r.t. Orwellian projections along a line of research initiated by [16] for opacity w.r.t.
natural projections. We also plan to instantiate opacity to Intransitive Non-interference
with Selective Declassification (INISD) which has been suggested recently in [15]. INISD
generalises INI by allowing to each downgrading action d to declassify only a subset H(d) of
non-observable events, which is more likely to be of practical interest. A structural definition
of this property for Petri nets has been proposed and its decidability has been investigated
in [17].
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